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Abstract In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of 
behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall 
identify where it goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and 
representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion. 
Keywords Qualia.Perceptualconsciousness.Spectruminversion.Functionalism. Representationalism . Self-
knowledge 
1 Introduction 
Ingrid and Norma are twin sisters. They were raised by the same loving, linguistically competent parents. They 
are disposed to apply the same color terms in every situation they will ever face. Although similar in many 
respects, it doesnʼt seem all that hard to imagine that one or both of these hypotheses is true: 
H1: In terms of their colors, red things seem to Ingrid the way that green things seem to Norma. 
H2: In terms of their experiences of colors, what itʼs like for Ingrid to see something red is what itʼs like for 
Norma to see something green. 
Are these hypotheses genuine possibilities? Thatʼs most unclear. The imaginable and the possible are two 
different things (Kripke 1980) (or, maybe imagining is harder than imagined (Kripke 1980)). Because weʼre 
interested in the possibility of inversion and weʼve learned the hard way that claims to conceivability are an 
unsure 
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guide to possibility, itʼs hard to know what to make of the claim that some cherished philosophical thesis is in 
conflict with the possibility of behaviorally undetectable inversion. Maybe I want to be a functionalist, a 
representationalist, I want to think that colors are represented by experience, and I really want to think that the 
physical is all that there is. So what if someone claims to be able to conceive of inversion? One recent author has 
stated bluntly, “Spectrum inversion is, to put it mildly, a fanciful possibility...many working philosophers are 
inclined to think that no serious person could rest much on it” (Thau 2002, 26). 
For better or worse, not everyone is impressed by the claims to find tales of behaviorally undetectable spectrum 
inversion conceivable, but, saying that this a fanciful possibility wonʼt make talk of this (alleged) possibility go 
away. What would move the discussion along is a clear, compelling demonstration of the impossibility of the 
inversion hypotheses. I want to look at some recent attempts to provide us with this demonstration. According to 
one commentator, these inversion hypotheses entail their own negations (Gibbons 2005, 399). According to 
another, we can show that these hypotheses couldnʼt possibly be true given our intuitive sense of what these 
subjects must believe, experience, and say (Sundstrom 2002, 65).1 Iʼll explain why these attempts have failed. 
This will allow me to explain how it is that inversion might be true even if we grant certain assumptions about 
perceptual consciousness thought to be at odds with the possibility of inversion. In particular, Iʼd like to suggest 
that even if your account of perceptual consciousness incorporates functionalist and representationalist elements, 
you could still rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of spectrum inversion. 
2 The Incoherence of Inversion 
The argument against our first inversion hypothesis can be stated as follows (Gibbons 2005; Sundstrom 2002). 
Ingrid and Norma are shown a red tile. If asked what color it was, theyʼll both say: 
(1) Thatʼs red. 
Assume that theyʼre both sincere. There is some inclination to think that they both speak the truth. If we assume 
that they both speak the truth and both are sincere, it seems we should say: 
(2) Norma believes that thatʼs red. (3) Ingrid believes that thatʼs red. 
Someone could say that while Ingrid and Norma assert that the tile is red, they donʼt believe that the tile is red, 
not because one of them is insincere, but because one of them does not know what ʻredʼ means. The trouble with 
this response is that it is hard to imagine why we should think it impossible for Ingrid to learn that ʻredʼ 
1 Sundstrom (2002) suggests that the argument under consideration develops some ideas discussed earlier by Harman (1990) and Shoemaker 
(1982). 
On the Coherence of Inversion 129 
means red if raised in Normaʼs linguistic environment. If it is possible for someone like Ingrid to learn that ʻredʼ 
means red and possible for her to believe what she says. Letʼs assume that (3) is true.2 
Ingrid and Norma are told that the lighting conditions are funny. Theyʼre told that there might be lights that make 
non-red objects look red. Ingrid and Norma say: 
(4) I donʼt know if what I saw was really red, but it seemed red. Assuming that both mean what they say and 
that theyʼre both competent English 
speakers, we should say: 
(5) Norma believes that she doesnʼt know whether what she saw was red, but she believes that it seemed red 
to her at the time. 
(6) Ingrid believes that she doesnʼt know whether what she saw was red, but she believes that it seemed red to 
her at the time. 
Thereʼs no reason to think that inverts have any difficulty determining how things seem to them introspectively. 
The same holds true for normally sighted perceivers. Anything Norma knows about her mind (i.e., that things 
seem such and such a way to her), Ingrid knows about her own mind. It seems we should be able to infer: 
(7) Norma knows that it seemed red to her at the time. (8) Ingrid knows that it seemed red to her at the 
time. 
Owing to the factivity of ʻknowsʼ, (7) and (8) entail that in terms of their colors, red things would seem to Norma 
the way it would to Ingrid, but that is just to deny our first inversion hypothesis, H1. The latent nonsense has 
been made manifest. 
What of our second hypothesis? Letʼs suppose that weʼve now ruled out the possibility of the first inversion 
hypothesis. Maybe Ingrid and Norma arenʼt inverted with respect to how the colors seem to them, but perhaps 
things are inverted in terms of what itʼs like for them to undergo these experiences. If the second hypothesis is 
still a live possibility, thatʼs because thereʼs some difference between the inversion of what itʼs like and the 
inversion of how things seem. However, to draw such a distinction, it seems youʼd have to deny one of the 
following: 
CR: Experiences represent the colors of objects.3 
F: If an experience represents the colors of objects, such an experience disposes the subject towards 
believing that the object seen is the color the experience represents it as being (Harman 1990). 
R: If two experiences e and eʼ are perfectly alike in their representational character, there is no difference in 
terms of what itʼs like to undergo e and eʼ (Tye 2000). 
2 This assumption is not my assumption, but an assumption crucial to the argument against the possibility of inversion. If you think that itʼs 
only possible for a subject to be linguistically competent in the use of our color language if the phenomenal character of this subjectʼs 
experience is indistinguishable from our own, you might reject this step in the argument. I shall grant it for the sake of discussion if only to 
show that we can grant this assumption and say that the inversion hypothesis remains a live possibility. 
3 For discussion, see Thau (2002). While heʼs right that you can square representationalism with the possibility of inversion by denying CR, I 
think weʼre not forced to deny that our experiences represent colors. 
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If we said that the second inversion hypothesis is possible, it seems weʼd have to assume that while things seem 
the same to both Ingrid and Norma, what itʼs like for them to view the same scenes would differ. But this seems 
incompatible with the triad. Weʼre assuming that the colors are represented in experience (CR). According to the 
functionalist, if the experiences represent the colors, the subject is disposed to believe that the objects they see 
have the colors their experiences represent (F). Weʼve observed that Ingrid and Norma believe the colors of the 
objects are the same, so it seems their experiences represent the colors of the objects they see as being the same. 
If we were to say that the representational properties of their experiences were the same so that in terms of how 
things seemed they were the same, but then denied that what itʼs like for them to undergo the experiences 
differed, weʼd have to deny that the properties that determine what the experiences are like are determined by the 
properties that determine the representational properties of experience. In other words, we would have to deny 
(R). So, it seems that if we accept the trio, weʼll have to say that weʼve demonstrated the impossibility of both 
inversion hypotheses once weʼve demonstrated the impossibility of the first. 
3 The Argument Extended 
Amy and Bianca are twin sisters. They were raised by the same loving, linguistically competent parents. They 
are disposed to apply the same color terms in every situation they will ever face.4 Although similar in many 
respects, it isnʼt hard to imagine that these hypotheses are true: 
H3: In terms of their colors, green things seem different to Amy and Bianca. H4: In terms of their 
experiences of colors, what itʼs like for Amy to see something 
green is different from what itʼs like for Bianca to see something green. 
To imagine that H3 and H4 are true, imagine that Amy can distinguish red from green by sight, but Bianca is 
blind to this difference between red and green things. Their parents have carefully arranged things so that neither 
Bianca nor Amy will ever encounter a red object. 
Shown a green tile, Amy and Bianca will utter: (1ʼ) Thatʼs green. 
4 This is important. Amy and Bianca will never face a situation in which they see something red. This means that while they will have different 
behavioral dispositions, they will not be disposed to respond differently to any situation they will ever encounter. If it is possible for such 
subjects to nevertheless both come to mean green by ʻgreenʼ, I canʼt see that this difference in behavioral dispositions will matter. If you think it 
is impossible for such subjects to come to mean green by ʻgreenʼ, I suspect that you are working from some assumptions about language use 
and learning that should lead you to say that Ingrid and Norma cannot come to mean the same things in their uses of color terms. Iʼm fine with 
that, but then you think, as I think, that the argument for the incoherence of inversion in the previous section fails. You just think it fails at a 
much earlier step than I am arguing here. 
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Assuming that theyʼre both sincere and that both are competent English speakers, it seems: 
(2ʼ) Amy knows that thatʼs green. (3ʼ) Bianca knows that thatʼs green. 
They are both taught to associate ʻgreenʼ with green objects and learn to correctly apply that term. It seems 
implausible to think that when they utter (1ʼ) they arenʼt saying that it is green. It seems implausible to think that 
they canʼt both believe what they say having been raised in the same linguistic community. It seems that they 
both believe the tile is green. Their judgments are reliably correct so itʼs implausible to deny (3ʼ) while accepting 
(2ʼ). 
After they saw the tile, Amy and Bianca were told that the lighting conditions were funny. Theyʼre told that there 
might be lights that make non-green objects look green. Now Amy and Bianca utter: 
(4ʼ) I donʼt know if what I saw was really green, but it seemed green. Assuming that both mean what they say 
and that theyʼre both competent speakers 
of English, we should say: 
(5ʼ) Amy believes that she doesnʼt know whether what she saw was green, but she believes that it seemed 
green to her at the time. 
(6ʼ) Bianca believes that she doesnʼt know whether what she saw was green, but she believes that it seemed 
green to her at the time. 
Now for the finishing touch. Anything Amy knows about her mind (i.e., that things seem such and such a way to 
him), Bianca should be able to know about her mind: 
(7ʼ) Amy knows that it seemed green to her at the time. (8ʼ) Bianca knows that it seemed green to her at the 
time. 
Owing to the factivity of ʻknowsʼ, (7ʼ) and (8ʼ) would seem to entail that in terms of its color, a green tile would 
seem the same (i.e., seem green) to Amy and Bianca. But that is just to deny H3. If we were to accept H4 having 
denied that H3 is possible, weʼd have to reject CR, R, or F. The latent nonsense of tales of colorblindness has 
now been made manifest. 
4 The Diagnosis 
Unless Iʼve missed some difference between the first and second arguments, the second proves that 
colorblindness is a myth if the first proves anything about spectrum inversion. That is the polite way of saying 
that the first tells us nothing about the possibility of inversion (that is the impolite way of saying it). Letʼs see if 
we can locate where the first argument goes wrong. 
Hereʼs an outline of the strategy for trying to demonstrate the impossibility of H1 and H2. Starting from the 
assumption that our pairs (Ingrid and Norma or Bianca and Amy) engage in the same linguistic behavior, we 
infer that our pairs assert the same things when placed in similar external circumstances (the first step). Next, we 
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infer that our subjects must express the same beliefs by means of these assertions (the second step). Next, we 
infer that our subjects must undergo experiences with the same representational content (the third step).5 Last, we 
infer that what itʼs like for our subjects to undergo these experiences must be subjectively indistinguishable (the 
fourth step). Having arrived at the third step in the derivation, we can infer that H1 is impossible. Having done 
so, we can infer that H2 is impossible. The justification for the third step derives from our functionalist 
assumptions. The justification for the fourth step derives from our representationalist assumptions. 
Hereʼs where I think this demonstration goes wrong. If we look at the rationale for the first step in the derivation, 
weʼll see that once it is in place, the functionalist assumptions cannot motivate the third step. Thatʼs why I think 
itʼs a mistake to suggest that in allowing for the possibility of inversion, weʼre forced to give up either our 
functionalist or representationalist assumptions. Moreover, if thereʼs no incompatibility between the claim that 
Ingrid and Norma or Amy and Bianca undergo subjectively different experiences on the one hand and 
functionalist and representationalist assumptions on the other, then there is no way to demonstrate the 
impossibility of either of our inversion hypotheses. The modal status of these hypotheses is still uncertain, but 
our right to remain uncertain about their modal status while remaining firmly wedded to representationalism and 
functionalism is certain. 
In order to establish claims about what these subjectsʼ experiences are like, we proceed from claims about what 
these subjects say to claims about what these subjects believe and experience. For example, in order to evaluate 
H1 and H2, weʼve tried to show that Ingrid and Norma have the same beliefs about the colors of the tiles that 
they see and the same beliefs about how things seem to them. These ascriptions are motivated by ascriptions 
about what they say. Why should we accept them? The answer weʼre given by both Gibbons and Sundstrom is 
that Ingrid and Norma belong to the same linguistic community and that while we donʼt always believe what we 
say, itʼs possible for Ingrid and Norma to believe what they say (Gibbons 2005, 400; Harman 1990, 48; 
Sundstrom 2002, 73; and Thau 2002, 18). Denying such possibilities is, apparently, unintuitive and unmotivated. 
Iʼm somewhat inclined to agree. Think about Bianca. It seems quite possible that sheʼd end up having just the 
same beliefs as her sister once sheʼs learned to use the same color terms with the same competence that her sister 
has. Why? Because itʼs implausible to think that the subjective differences that distinguish her from her sister 
would constitute an insurmountable obstacle to her learning to identify green things by sight in her environment 
or to say that something is green having received just the same training as her linguistically competent sister. 
However, if itʼs implausible to say that the subjective differences between Amy and Bianca would prevent Amy 
and Bianca from becoming subjects that will be disposed to say that the same things are green, blue, etc... and 
believe that the same things are green, 
5 I think that Gibbons and Sundstrom arenʼt necessarily alone in moving too quickly from claims about what these subjects believe to what 
these subjectsʼ experiences must be like. In his discussion, Thau raises the rhetorical question, concerning pairs of subjects both of whom 
believe something they see is red, “if our respective visual experiences lead each of us to believe that itʼs red, how could either of our visual 
experiences fail to represent it as red?” (2002, 13). 
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blue, etc..., itʼs implausible to say that the subjective differences between Ingrid and Norma would constitute an 
insurmountable obstacle to their sharing the same beliefs about the colors of the objects they see. 
So, letʼs say that in spite of the differences in their experiences there are processes that enable both Ingrid and 
Norma, as well as Amy and Bianca, to become competent speakers (i.e., say ʻredʼ when theyʼre supposed to; say 
that something is red when they use ʻredʼ). However, someone might object, isnʼt this inconsistent with certain 
functionalist assumptions? A functionalist like Harman will say that if an experience represents something as 
having some sensible quality, F, that experience disposes the subject to believe that the thing is F (Harman 1990, 
46). It is somewhat implausible to say that an experience, e, represents something as having a sensible quality 
such as redness, while also representing that thing as having a second sensible quality, such as greenness. It is 
somewhat more implausible than this to suggest that one of two subjects who know that something is red because 
of their perceptual experiences will undergo an experience, e, that represents something as being both red and 
green. But isnʼt that what my view amounts to? 
Not quite. Suppose we grant that when Ingrid sees something green and says that the thing she sees is green, 
sheʼs disposed to believe it is green having undergone that experience. Thereʼs no inconsistency in saying that her 
experience disposes her to believe the thing is red if we add that something overrides this disposition and 
explains why sheʼs disposed to believe something is green having undergone an experience that represents the 
thing as red and thereby disposes her to believe that itʼs red (and is disposed to believe something is red having 
undergone an experience that disposes her to think it is green). Dispositions can, after all, be overridden. The 
magnets on my refrigerator are disposed to fall in virtue of their mass, but to remain in place in virtue of its 
magnetic powers.6 To accommodate the functionalist assumptions, we simply have to posit something that 
disposes Ingrid to believe green things are green that overrides the experienceʼs disposition to cause her to think 
otherwise. 
Is there any plausible candidate for playing this role? I think there is. More importantly, I think that my target 
cannot plausibly deny that there is. Remember that weʼve been told that it is implausible to think that someone 
like Ingrid, who is raised by linguistically competent speakers with experiences like ours, would not become the 
kind of person who says that the green things she sees are green or the red things she sees are red having 
associated those terms with objects with those colors for their entire lives. This is, after all, how we make sense 
of the idea that someone like Bianca, who is blind to the difference between red and green, can say and believe 
that green things are green in his carefully controlled environment. It is in virtue of the beliefs we must posit in 
order to explain their linguistic competence that these subjects are disposed to think that the colors are what we 
think they are in spite of the differences between experiences like ours and experiences like theirs. It has been 
something of a staple in philosophy of mind and language that certain kinds of subjective differences between 
individuals and their mental lives wonʼt constitute an insurmountable obstacle to these individuals coming to 
have beliefs with the same contents in the same external circumstances in spite of these subjective differences. 
6 Thanks to Luke Robinson for the example. 
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But, someone might now object, isnʼt this position inconsistent with the representationalist assumption? 
According to the representationalist, we cannot say that Ingrid and Normaʼs experiences have the same 
representational content while saying that what itʼs like for them to undergo these experiences differ. How can I 
possibly say that there is a sense in which Ingridʼs experiences are inverted with respect to Normaʼs if both know 
that when they see the red tile it seems red to them? If I say that this is true and that the tile seems red to them, to 
say that theyʼre inverted would seem to require distinguishing those properties that determine what itʼs like for 
them to undergo an experience of the sort they (typically) undergo when they see a red tile and those that 
determine what such experiences represent. But thatʼs to deny the representationalist thesis that there cannot be 
phenomenal differences in the absence of representational differences. 
I think this objection can also be dealt with, but doing so requires us to proceed with some care. Think about 
Bianca. She has learned to identify green things by sight in her carefully controlled environment. It seems she 
can say, truthfully, that she knows that something seems green to her when he hears that the lighting conditions 
are funny having just reported that she saw something green. But, in terms of how things seem, things seem quite 
different to Amy and Bianca precisely because only one of them is blind to the difference between red and green. 
There are two lessons to be drawn from this. Hereʼs the first. Think about the scope of perceptual knowledge, the 
range of things you can know in light of your experience of the external world. It seems natural to say that 
someone like Bianca can know the colors of green things in her environment by looking even though his 
experiences do not represent things as being green. That is to say, we ascribe knowledge in a way that is at odds 
with the following assumption: 
KLR: Sʼs perceptual knowledge is limited to knowledge of just those properties represented by Sʼs experiences. 
A number of examples speak against this thesis, KLR. In addition to Biancaʼs knowledgeable judgments about 
the location of green objects, think about the judgment youʼd make upon hearing what you take to be your 
obnoxious neighborʼs motorcycle. “Itʼs the obnoxious neighbor who drives the Harley”, you think to yourself. 
Having learned to identify the motorcycleʼs engine by its distinctive sound, such a judgment would appear to be 
the sort of judgment that could constitute perceptual knowledge. The belief that itʼs the Harley neednʼt be an 
inferential belief even though your experience does not have as part of its content anything about the engineʼs 
particular make. The judgment about your knowledge, I submit, is consistent with our ordinary practice of 
knowledge ascriptions.7 The judgment about the content of the experiences that give rise to that bit of knowledge 
is motivated by a principle to the effect that: 
RV: The properties represented by Sʼs experiences are limited to those properties such that if S judges a has F 
on the basis of veridical experience, that experience involves the veridical representation of qualities, the 
possession of which, would entail that a has F (Smith 2002, 49). 
7 For further discussion of such examples and the status of KLR, see Brewer (1999, 246) and Millar (2000). 
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While there might be perceptual illusions of color, size, shape, and the like, I doubt that if you heard a 
motorcycle that sounded just like a Harley that was made by some other company, weʼd classify this as a case of 
perceptual illusion. The mistaken judgment isnʼt due to the fact that the experience represents something as being 
a Harley, although we might say that someone could know perceptually that something is a Harley. 
If we can say that perceptual knowledge extends beyond knowledge of properties that are represented by 
experience, we can say that the judgment about how things ʻseemʼ can pertain to states of affairs you might 
possibly know to obtain on the basis of perceptual experience even though those experiences do not represent the 
presence of those properties, per se. And this allows us to reconcile the hypothesis that Ingrid truly is inverted 
with both the functionalist and representationalist assumption. There appears to be a use of ʻseemsʼ governed by a 
rule of roughly the following sort: 
ES: S can truthfully say ʻIt know it seems Fʼ if F is a property S can knowingly attribute on the basis of 
experience even if the experienceʼs representa- tional content doesnʼt represent something as being F. The 
judgment ʻIt seems Fʼ is true only if S is overall disposed that the thing is F if S forms a belief having taken 
experience at face value. 
There is logical space for a view on which there is a property, F, such that someone could knowingly attribute it 
on the basis of experience even though F-ness is not itself part of the experienceʼs representational content. Such 
a view is the natural one to take with respect to Bianca and so it cannot be wrong to extend it to say something 
about Ingrid on grounds of being incoherent. 
I said that there was a second lesson to be drawn from our description of Amy, Bianca, and their knowledge of 
how things seem. By hypothesis, things seem quite different to Amy and Bianca. Bianca is colorblind, but Amy 
is not. But, by hypothesis, the judgments they knowingly make about how things seem are identical. And that 
seems like excellent evidence for saying that ʻseemsʼ judgments are potentially ambiguous. On one reading, Iʼll 
call it the doxastic reading, judgments about how things ʻseemʼ are judgments about what someone would believe 
on the basis of experience if they were to judge something about the external world in light of their experience. 
On this reading, ʻseemsʼ conforms to ES. On a second reading, Iʼll call it the phenomenal reading, judgments 
about how things ʻseemʼ are judgments about what itʼs like for the subject to undergo an experience. To use 
Harmanʼs jargon, they pertain to the intrinsic qualities of the experience. Because weʼre trying to accommodate 
representationalism, we should assume that on the phenomenal reading of ʻseemsʼ, the judgment that it seems 
such and such a way to someone carries with it implications about the representational contents of their 
experiences. However, because weʼve rejected KLR, such judgments are logically independent from judgments 
about how things ʻseemʼ on the doxastic reading. Thus, judgments about how things seem (doxastically) cannot 
be used to determine the facts about how things are in terms of the phenomenal character of an experience or its 
representational content. 
If we reject KLR, we can deal with one final objection. How is it, someone might ask, that Audrey and Ingrid 
might be inverted if they can both say truthfully ʻI know 
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it seems redʼ when viewing a red tile? Well, in the same way that Amy and Bianca might differ subjectively 
when they can both truthfully say ʻI know it seems greenʼ when viewing a green tile. They can truthfully say 
these things because such assertions are about a different subject matter than judgments about how things seem 
phenomenally. Their judgments are not judgments that pertain only to properties that are represented by 
experience, whereas the sense of ʻseemsʼ we use in formulating the inversion hypotheses do pertain only to those 
properties (this is a use of ʻseemsʼ that doesnʼt conform to ES). In their carefully controlled environment, Amy 
and Bianca are disposed to judge the same things about the colors of objects when both take experience at face 
value in spite of the differences in the representational contents of their experiences. Hence, while the colors 
seem different to Amy and Bianca, in terms of the colors objects seem to have, they seem the same. And, while 
things seem (phenomenally) different to Ingrid and Norma, in terms of the colors objects seem (doxastically) to 
have, they seem the same. When Ingrid and Norma say ʻThe tile seems redʼ, what they say is true because what 
theyʼd believe if they took experience at face value is that the thing is red (this is true in spite of the fact that only 
Norma has an experience with a representational content such that the experience is veridical only if the tile is 
red). So, while someone might assert that inversion is possible, asserting in effect that (phenomenally) how 
things seem differ for Ingrid and Norma, such an assertion is not corrected by the further assertion that they can 
both knowingly say the same red thing ʻseems redʼ. In other words, (7) and (8) are consistent with H1 and H2 on 
their proper readings. 
Let me make one final observation about the argument for the incoherence of inversion. If Ingrid and Norma 
differ in the way that Iʼve suggested they might differ consistent with the (1)–(8) then it seems that one of these 
subjects has color experiences that are not veridical. It seems, then, that if someone wants to give a compelling 
demonstration for the incoherence of inversion they will want to provide some additional argument to show that 
it would be implausible to suggest that one of these subjectsʼ experiences is illusory. Whatever shape this 
argument takes, it would appear that the considerations that support (1–8) are insufficient to establish this further 
claim that neither subjectsʼ experience misrepresents the colors if one subjectʼs experiences are veridical. It seems 
we have a coherent model that explains how (1–8) could be true consistent with the hypothesis that only one 
subjectʼs experience is veridical. 
At bottom, the problem with the argument against the possibility of inversion is that it equivocates. If we 
formulate the inversion hypotheses using the phenomenal senses of ʻseemsʼ, we oughtnʼt argue that such 
hypotheses are impossible by eliciting judgments about how things ʻseemʼ on the doxastic readings. Not unless 
we have independent reason for saying that these judgments are logically related to each other. However, weʼve 
seen that neither functionalist nor representationalist assumptions provide any reason for saying that these 
judgments are logically related to each other. How could they? They are theses about mind and experience, not 
about the subject matter of English expressions. Weʼve also seen that thereʼs some intuitive pressure to say that 
judgments about how things seem phenomenally and doxastically should be taken to be logically distinct. If we 
donʼt, itʼs hard to make sense of whatʼs going on with Amy and Bianca, and once this is granted, it seems all the 
pieces fall into place. Assuming H1 and H2, it isnʼt surprising that Ingrid and 
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Norma have the same beliefs about the colors and say the same things about the colors, even if we assume 
functionalism and representationalism. Thatʼs not to say that H1 or H2 is possible, but only that its impossibility 
is difficult to demonstrate, and its significance for the philosophy of perception difficult to discern. 
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